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MEN AND MEASURES IN THE LAW. By Arthur T. Vanderbilt, with an intro-
duction by E. Blythe Stason, Dean of the University of Michigan Law
School. New York: Alfred A. IKnopf, 1949. Pp. xv, 156.
THE material in this interesting little book is the text of five lectures de-
livered by New Jersey's distinguished Chief Justice on the William W. Cook
Foundation at the University of Michigan in 1948. The amount of space
filled by their pages is not large; the reading time is not long. But the value
of what is said is not in this instance to be measured by the number of words
used to say it.
"I can easier teach twenty what were good to be done, than be one of the
twenty to follow mine own teaching," says Portia. Whether easy or not, the
Chief Justice has been following his own teaching for many years in his active
and highly useful career in the law. He has been an eminent and successful
practicing lawyer. He has been a law teacher and very active dean in a large
and important law school. He has worked in the ranks and has been president
of the American Bar Association. He has worked steadily for procedural im-
provement; a notable instance among many was as Chairman of the Supreme
Court's Advisory Committee for the new Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
He has worked consistently for good government in his own community. And
most recently as Chief Justice in New Jersey he has turned his energy and
leadership to the improvement of judicial administration in his home state.
When, in these lectures, he talks- about the lawyer's responsibilit
, 
for making
his profession serve the public interest, he is giving not simply wise admoni-
tion to young lawyers, nor yet only his mature standard of values, but also a
profession of his own fighting faith.
The chapter headings and subheadings show the scope of the discussion.
The writer speaks of law in books, law in action and law in law schools. An-
other chapter discusses the growth of substantive law, with three star credit
for Lord Mansfield. The last two lectures are devoted to "Procedure-The
Stumbling Block," a field where Judge Vanderbilt can speak with both en-
thusiasm and authority. Especially good is the discussion of the appellate
function.
Here are some happy phrases found along the way: "The predominance of
important judges on a judicial council . . . [is] almost a guarantee that noth-
ing fundamental or substantial [sic] will be accomplished."
As to judges and judicial reform: "A weak judge is always afraid of where
he will end up if changes come. . . .The strong judge . ..often enjoys ad-
vantages in the status quo that might be disturbed in any orderly remolding
of the judicial system." "It is always easier to enact substantive law affecting
people generally than it is to change rules of court, which affect lawyers and
judges in particular."
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With the objectives which concern Judge Vanderbilt and with what he
thinks worth working for there is little or no disagreement. Many enlight-
ened lawyers share them though few have worked for them so hard as he. But
along the way, there are dicta to argue about, as is customary among lawyers.
For instance, do lawyers lack a sense of individual responsibility for leader-
ship in public opinion? The author says so. This reviewer would make the
criticism differently to the effect that lawyers too often lead public opinion
without adequate knowledge on which to express views, much less argue for
them.
Again, how much must the lawyer know and how much of it should the law
schools try to teach him? Must he know "both the common law and the civil
law on a comparative basis ?" Have the law schools "lamentably failed to ap-
preciate their responsibility for the educational qualifications of their students
in the way . . . the medical schools have?" It is probably true that "In very
few of our law schools . . . is any consideration given to the primary impor-
tance of lawyers assuming individual responsibility for party leadership or in-
teresting themselves in local affairs." But should there be, except by example
and a general atmosphere recognizing that lawyers have public responsibili-
ties ?
Lawyers in both private and public capacities ought to know a great deal.
Some of what they need to know can be learned in law school. A foundation
for some of it should have been acquired before the student came to law
school. Sometimes it is; sometimes not. But education cannot stop with
graduation. "All too often," says the author, "the lawyer looks on his license
to practice as an official certification that he knows all about the law that he
needs to know for a lifetime." Judge Vanderbilt is certainly right in pointing
out that this point of view is wrong. I doubt that the law schools can supply
the extra learning to make it right. The process of education must be continu-
ous in law as elsewhere. The experience of the joint committee on continuing
legal education of the American Law Institute and the American Bar Associa-
tion is finding, to its great satisfaction, that our profession is rapidly recogniz-
ing that fact.
HERBERT F. GOODRICnt
Dicay's CoNFLIcT OF LAWS. Sixth edition, under the general editorship of
J. H. C. Morris with specialist editors. London: Stevens & Sons, Ltd. and
Sweet & Maxwell, Ltd., 1949. Pp. cxxix, 912.
DicaY's sixth edition of Conflict of Laws is out with full standard equip-
ment including Corrigenda, Preface, Table of Foreign Cases, Table of Cases,
Table of Statutes, Table of Books, Table of Periodicals, Table of Principles
and Rules, Introduction and Index. The book is bound in deluxe fabrikoid
t Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
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upholstery, weighs 3 pounds, 7 ounces and sells for 4 pounds, 10 shillings
f.o.b. London, or 12 dollars and 60 cents delivered in New Haven (18 dollars
pre-devaluation exchange).
This work, predecessor in form to the American Law Institute's Restate-
ment of the Common Law, was originally (1896) prepared as a categorical
statement of general rules, followed by explanatory comment and illustra-
tions. The new edition follows the same pattern. Inasmuch as the work is
intended to be "essentially a practitioner's book, not a work on theoretical ju-
risprudence," it is to be presumed that this manner of presentation has found
enduring favor with the English bar. "The technique of Rule, Comment and
Illustration," says the general editor, "is not one which all of us would have
adopted if we had been writing our own book on the Conflict of Laws." That
English lawyers react to stimuli of this type much as their American brothers
is suggested by the further observation that "the method has the disadvantage
that it is sometimes apt to produce a false impression of certainty when au-
thority is scanty or conflicting." Indeed, as Falconbridge has pointed out, the
editor admits a "regrettable tendency on the part of [English] judges to treat
Dicey's propositions as a final statement, perfect in form and merely subject to
be checked or modified here and there" (p. xiv). Nevertheless, the general
editor finds that "the method undoubtedly possesses advantages for the prac-
ticing lawyer," a statement probably more accurate in reference to Dicey
where cases and other authority are cited to support blackletter rules than to
the American Restatements.
The new Dicey omits the chapter on British nationality on the adequate
grounds that its relation to Conflict of Laws is all but negligible and on the
more dubious grounds that the British Nationality Act of 1948 has so compli-
cated the subject that-hardly anybody can understand it. The reader also gets
the somewhat irrelevant information that for the convenience of practitioners
who have been accustomed to find an account of nationality within the pages
of Dicey, a treatment of the subject by one of the specialist editors will be
published in another book.
Also omitted from this edition are most of the references to American cases
because, among other reasons, of the difficulty of keeping up with them "and
the consequent risk of referring to cases that no longer represent the law."
The book is replete, however, with general references to the standard Ameri-
can works on the subject including those of Story, Beale, Goodrich, Lorenzen
and Cook, as well as to the Restatement of Conflict of Laws.
A valuable contribution of the sixth edition is its treatment of the highly im-
portant preliminary problems of the Conflict of Laws, most of which, appar-
ently, the collective conscience of the editors would not permit them to reduce
to Rule, Comment and Illustration. One will search in vain in the index to
the first edition for any reference to renvoi, qualification or characterization,
although there is a footnote statement of the case of Collier v. Rivaz, 2 Curt.
855 (1841) (p. 77), and a brief discussion of the ambiguity in the phrase "law
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of a country" (pp. 5, 6). The fifth edition (1932) contains a somewhat more
extended discussion of renvoi in the Appendix and a brief footnote reference
to primary characterization (p. 43). Indeed, we have it from the general edi-
tor that it was not until 1934: that the problem of characterization was intro-
duced to English Lawyers (p. 62).1 The sixth edition contains an adequate
survey of the learning on these intriguing subjects as well as some critical
comments by the editors.
To one familiar with English cases such as Re Annesley, [1926] Ch. 692, Re
Ross, [1930] 1 Ch. 377, Re Askew, [1930] 2 Ch. 259, Re O'Keefe, [1940]
Ch. 124, and Re Duke of Wellington, [1947] Ch. 506, it may come as a mild
surprise to learn that the law of a given country means "usually the local or
domestic law which the courts of that country apply to the decisions of a case
to which the Rule refers." And yet, as is correctly pointed out, the total renvoi
theory has never been applied by English courts outside the field of succession
and personal status. This fact induces the editors to differ from the state-
ments of law contained in the fifth edition (p. 866) and come to the plausible
conclusion that "the truth would appear to be that in some situations the doc-
trine is convenient and promotes justice, and that in other situations the doc-
trine is inconvenient and ought to be rejected" (p. 56).
The problem of characterization is handled largely by summarizing the
views of the principal authors who have written in English on the subject,
especially Beckett, Lorenzen, Falconbridge, Cheshire, Robertson and Cook.
The editors are reluctant to accept the distinction between primary and sec-
ondary characterization (to say nothing of tertiary characterization) and are
hospitable neither to the suggestion of solution by reference to the law of the
forum nor to characterization by the lex cautsae. Instead, they indicate a prefer-
ence for Falconbridge's view that the court of the forum should consider the
provisions of any potentially applicable laws in their context before definitely
selecting the proper law-a principle which, the editors believe, will make the
process of characterization "fully flexible." At this point, at least one reader
gets the impression of detachment from reality which so frequently accom-
panies a discussion of theories in a vacuum. There is little or no treatment of
the policy considerations concealed in the characterization problem and barely
a suggestion of any value-standards by which these policies can be measured.
And if it be suggested that the English writers are far less concerned about
such matters than American or Continental scholars, it may be questioned that
a major work designed as "essentially a practitioner's book" should assume
that the English lawyer is content to practice his profession without an under-
standing of what he is talking about.
Finally, in this connection, there is included in the treatment of these pre-
liminary matters a discussion of the less frequently noted "incidental question"
(including those of the second degree), i.e. the problem involved where the
principal issue is referred by the forum's Conflict of Laws rule to the appro-
1. By Beckett in TuE BRITISH YEAR BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.
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priate foreign law but there bob up subsidiary or collateral questions which
themselves involve foreign elements. Should the subsidiary or collateral issues
be governed by the appropriate Conflict of Laws rule of the forum or by the
Conflict of Laws rule of the foreign law which governs the main question?
The editors hesitatingly indicate a preference for the Conflict of Laws rule of
the forum, quoting Nussbaum 2 for the statement that not a single English,
American, or Continental case has been found which so much as discusses the
problem of the "incidental question." 3
In conclusion, it may be said that the sixth edition of Dicey's book, in the
main, perpetuates the virtues and the faults of the original work. What Dicey
called the "positive method" as distinguished from the "theoretical method" is
religiously followed. The many important developments in the Conflict of
Laws since the date of the fifth edition (1932), especially as they have af-
fected English law, are reflected. The recent English cases have been col-
lected with painstalking care by J. H. C. Morris4 and his corps of specialist edi-
tors5 and incorporated with skill into the running documentation. The Rules
have been appropriately modified or changed, new exceptions added and cor-
responding Comment and Illustrations added, deleted or qualified. Dicey's
sixth edition, although something less than inspired, is a good job, done in the
solid tradition of English legal scholarship and, on the whole, is reasonably
well calculated to serve the purpose intended by the original author and the
new editors.
FowLE V. HARPM 7t
2. PINCI LES OF PRIVATE ImTERNATrONAL LAW 105 (1943).
3. Here again, the American reader is apt to lose patience with the slavish adher-
ence to the "positive method." The editors express their preference as "more consistent
with the approach" adopted by the House of Lords in Shaw v. Gould, L.R. 3 H.I 55
(1868). It does not leap to this reviewer's eye in any persuasive form just why the au-
thors of a major work on a difficult subject, with no examination of the policy factors in-
volved, or indeed with no critical analysis of any ind, should take a position based solely
on "the approach" of the House of Lords in a seventy-year old case which is only du-
biously in point on a part of the question involved.
4. Of Gray's Inn, Barrister-at-Law; Fellow and Tutor of 11agdalen College, Ox-
ford; All Souls Lecturer in Private International Law.
5. The imposing array includes L. Cowen, of Gray's Inn, Barrister-at-Law; Fel-
low and Tutor of Oriel College, Oxford; Vinerian Law Scholar; R. Cross, Solicitor,
Fellow and Tutor of Magdalen College, Oxford; 0. Kahn-Freund, of the Middle Temple,
Barrister-at-Law; Reader in Law in the University of London; K. Lipstein, Lecturer in
Law in the University of Cambridge; C Parry, of Gray's Inn and the South-Eastern
Circuit, Barrister-at-Law; Fellow and Tutor of Dovning College, Cambridge; Lecturer
in Law in the University of Cambridge; R. S. Welsh, of the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-
Law; Advocate of the Supreme Court of South Africa, Vinerian Law Scholar; and B. A.
Worthley, of Gray's Inn, Barrister-at-Law; Professor of Jurisprudence and International
Law in the University of Manchester.
' Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
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THE CASE OF GENERAL YAMASHITA. By A. Frank Reel. Chicago: The Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1949. Pp. vi, 324. $4.00.
THE dissenting opinions in the Supreme Court'-the moral indignation of
the one and the almost Biblical flavor of the other-publicly record the injus-
tice done to General Yamashita. But Mr. Reel has distilled the drama from
this record and has added facts within his personal knowledge which explains
some, if not all, the causes for this debasement of American law. In lay lan-
guage, yet with a lawyer's precision, Mr. Reel has detailed the events from
October 1, 1945 when the military commission to try Tomoyuki Yamashita was
established, to February 23, 1946, when he was hanged. What happened in
these five months-indeed that so much happened so quickly, the arraignment
of an enemy general, the preparation of his defense, his trial and conviction,
his appeal to the Philippine and United States Supreme Courts-is the meas-
ure of war's debilitating effect upon our institutions. And though Mr. Reel's
book is quietly and tastefully written, it speaks with the roar of our collective
conscience.
Yet in all human affairs some good derives from evil. In its Yamashita
decision, for example, the Supreme Court rejected the pernicious argument of
the Government that the trial was wholly a political matter, beyond the cog-
nizance of the courts even to the limited extent of the inquiry allowed by the
writ of habeas corpus.2 Nor is this the first time in judicial history that a
great principle has been established in a case which did not give it full ap-
plication.3
But the case was creative of a far greater good. The wrongs committed
against General Yamashita evoked fine passions. The opinions of Mr. Justice
Murphy and Mr. Justice Rutledge are among the most impressive documents
we have of devotion to constitutional ideals. No less fine was the devotion
of counsel, of whom Mr. Reel was one, appointed to defend General Yama-
shita. As Mr. Justice Rutledge wrote:
"One basic protection of our system, and only one, petitioner has
had. He has been represented by able counsel, officers of the Army
he fought. Their difficult assignment has been done with extraor-
dinary fidelity-not only to the accused, but to their high conception
of military justice.4
That our system of justice invokes such fervor and integrity, both in judge
1. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
2. As to the jurisdictional questions involved in the Yamashita decision, see Wolfson,
Americans Abroad and Habeas Corpus, 9 FFm. B.J. 142, n.3 (1948).
3. The opinion of Chief Justice Stone has been criticized chiefly for its mysterious
and equivocal handling of the constitutional issues. In his defense, it should be said, how-
ever, that it is not unusual for a judicial opinion to be elusive in order that a majority
may be obtained in its support. Cf. Frankfurter, "The Administrative Sid' of Chief
Justice Hughes, 63 HA.v. L. Rnv. 1 (1949).
4. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 45 (1946).
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and counsel, is perhaps more significant for its future than its occasional
lapses, even such a major one as that which Mr. Reel portrays.
Possibly the most dangerous aspect of this particular lapse is that, because
of the "unprecedented" nature of the trial,' it appears unique and yet is not.
For as Mr. Reel states the facts, the defects of the Yamashita trial are not
unrelated to complaints often made about military justice. First, and fore-
most perhaps, there appears to have been interference by a superior officer,
General MacArthur, who "urged" haste.0 Secondly, despite the unusual legal
grounding of the proceeding, despite the fact that the charge against Yama-
shita, failure to control his troops, was ingeniously "legal" 7 and despite the
serious problems of law and evidence which confronted it, the military com-
mission consisted of five generals, none of whom was a lawyer or had had
legal training. All the major abuses of the trial's procedure-the failure to
give the defense adequate time, the admission of obviously improper evi-
dence such as a United States Army propaganda film and "hearsay, once,
twice or thrice removed""-are adequately explained by these two facts.0
But there were, in addition, other gross irregularities and crudities too numer-
ous to catalogue, e.g., the attempt to make the trial into a spectacle with fa-
cilities such as dieg lights for cameramen and special seats for "generals and
important guests,"'1 the grim and tasteless irony of announcing Yamashita's
sentence on December 7th, the refusal of General facArthur to stay Yama-
shita's execution pending action by the Supreme Court. These also manifest
the dangers of entrusting judicial processes to an organization which, far from
sharing legal traditions, is antithetical to them.
Added to the extreme doubtfulness of the defendant's guilt whether con-
sidered in terms of the charge or in terms of more orthodox conceptions of
personal responsibility, the abuses, major and minor, make a sordid tale in-
deed. Mr. Reel's final and successful play on our sympathies by his descrip-
5. Id. at 42.
6. P. 85. Throughout the book there are suggestions that General MNacArthur's
influence on the military commission was extremely important. It is mere understatement
to add that the ban on the publication in Japan of Mr. Reel's book underscores these
suggestions.
7. See note 9 infra.
8. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 44 (1946).
9. Left unexplained, however, is the form of the charge against Yamasbita. The
charge was, in essence, that he had failed to control his troops. As Mir. Reel points out,
if General Yamashita denied control of his troops, then he was guilty of this charge. If,
on the other hand, he admitted control of them, he vas guilty of their atrocities on a more
orthodox "command responsibility" theory. Thus, one of the question asked by the prose-
cutor was "Did you fail to control your troops? Please answer 'Yes' or 'No'l" P. 163.
It is difficult to understand approval of this charge by high American military au-
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tion of the personable dignity of the defendant is perhaps only confusing of
the issues."'
Yet just as there is danger in disassociating Yamashita's trial from military
justice in general, there is danger in associating it too closely with war
crimes trials, and Mr. Reel, in his last chapter, comes within a hair's breadth
of destroying some of the effectiveness of his book by indulging in a discus-
sion, happily short, of the merits of war crimes trials in general. For al-
though he recognizes at least one fundamental difference in the Yamashita
and Nuremberg proceedings,12 by his participation in the "trial by victor" and
"ex post facto" debate he almost succeeds in leading his reader astray. The
significance of the Yamashita trial is that, even if all the premises of war
crimes trials be valid, nevertheless Yamashita was not tried on a just charge
nor given a fair trial. Our shame is not that Yamashita was tried according
to erroneous legal principles but that we did not adhere to our own accepted
and announced standards. That shame will continue until we acknowledge it.
"It is not too early, it is never too early, for the nation steadfastly to follow
its great constitutional traditions, none older or more universally protective
against unbridled power than due process of law in the trial and punishment
of all men, that is, of all men, whether citizens, aliens, alien enemies or enemy
belligerents. It can become too late."' 3  Mr. Reel has performed a public
service by publishing his book before it became too late.
RicHARD F. WOLFsoNt
MAGNA CARTA, 1300-1629. By Faith Thompson. Minneapolis: The University
of Minnesota Press, 1948. Pp. x, 410. $6.50.
TE barristers, Hallam, Brougham, and May, began the writing of English
constitutional history, but it was Froude with his love of statutes and Stubbs
with his worship of charters who really put the law into England's histories.
In 1855, the year before Froude published his dramatic story of the Tudor
Reformation, he advocated the teaching of history from the statute book.
Statutes, he declared, were "the contemporary judgments of the sober minds
11. Compare Homma v. Patterson, 327 U.S. 759 (1946).
12. "In the Nuremberg trials three types of crime were alleged: first, offenses against
the peace, conspiring and planning and undertaking to wage a war of aggression; second,
offenses on racial religious grounds, covering pre-war years as well as wartime; third,
offenses against persons and property in the conduct of the war, in violation of the laws
of war. Only those Nuremberg defendants who were charged within the third category
can be compared to General Yamashita. And it is interesting to note that in the Nurem-
berg indictments great care was taken to allege that these particular prisoners 'author-
ized, directed, or participated in' the actual crimes. Nowhere in the record of the Nurem-
berg trials can there be found the cavalier disregard of that touchstone of our criminal
law-the element of personal culpability-that signalize the Yamashita case." P. 242.
13. Mr. Justice Rutledge, dissenting in In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 41-2 (1946).
t Member of the New York Bar; Guggenheim Fellow, 1949-1950.
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of England." They were the considered conclusions of wise statesmen and
lawyers in Henry VIII's High Court of Parliament, and Parliament's many
acts served as a skeleton to articulate Froude's galloping narrative. For stu-
dents of both law and history, Stubbs prepared his Selc Charters in 1870, and
this little book still remains a text at Oxford. Then came a generation of
lawyer-historians--Maitland, whose genius made legal history a part of Eng-
land's literature, Vinogradoff, Pollock and G. J. Turner-whose works as-
sured to the law a place forevermore in English history. By putting the law
into history, the lawyers added an irreducible minimum of solid substance-
solid because the legal arrangements which order society at any given time
are both significant to contemporaries and of consequence to posterity. Long
after the departure of England's kings and captains, England's laws remained
to work their effects upon the body politic.
Furthermore, the lawyers also equipped historians with many of their
scholarly techniques. The gathering of evidence, its verification and evalua-
tion, recourse to legal records, the citation of authorities, and the summing up
of conclusions have become part of the historian's method. So brilliant was
the golden age of English constitutional history (1870-1920) that ordinary
text books still retain a legal cast. Medieval history, especially, is riddled with
law and custom. Even American students read about Henry II's possessory
assizes, Edward I's statutes of mortmain and quia emptores, Henry VIII's
statutes of uses and proclamations, to say nothing of the Bill of Rights and
Magna Carta.
The story of what Magna Carta meant to men after 1300, and of the uses to
which they turned it, is the theme of Miss Thompson's book. In 1925, she
published the history of the Charter's first hundred years, and now the sequel
carries the tale on to 1629, the year after Coke completed his Second In-
stitute with commentary on Magna Carta. Hers is a history of an idea, a
slogan, as well as of a bundle of laws many of which were obsolete before
even Coke began to write. But the basic legal principles are not yet dead, and
they still fashion the form and spirit of England's common law, public and
private. Miss Thompson tells of the various kinds of men-pleaders and
judges, councillors and parliamentarians, churchmen and Londoners, readers
and students at the Inns of Court, printers and chroniclers-all of whom
talked and wrote about the Great Charter. Although they abused, as well as
used, the blessed document to serve their ends, such men, Miss Thompson
explains, not only created the "myth of Magna Carta," but they were also
"the real 'makers of the English constitution.'" For after all, they kept living
the principles, notably sanctity of contract and due process of law, implicit in
the rules laid down at Runnymede.
Professor Thompson lets these later men speak for themselves. Hence
her volume is replete with quotations from the writings they left behind, sup-
plemented by recent scholars' interpretations of their meanings. Here, per-
haps, the dread and fear of inadequate proof has driven Miss Thompson to
19Mo
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reinforce the original evidence and her own cautious deductions therefrom
with whole paragraphs from modern authorities. Her assiduity in garnering
what men wrote about the Charter fulfills the lawyer's cry for evidence. But
the sum total seems noteworthy more for completeness than for selectivity.
A finer evaluation of the effects which the various views on the charter had
for both contemporaries and posterity might have pointed up the genuine
value and importance of Miss Thompson's findings.
The passion for completeness and thoroughness reflects the cult which
historians between the Wars made of exhausting, multi-archival research.
Few scholars have realized more completely or more literally than Miss
Thompson the ideal of the actualist school of history: to tell in all its fullness
and detail what men actually did and said. She has, perhaps, carried the
lawyer's method to an all-too-logical conclusion in attaching to the glosses on
the Charter recent writers' glosses on the glossators-McIlwaine on Prynne
on Coke on c. 40 of Magna Carta. Ruled cases in which the Charter was cited
are described and expounded with excerpts from readings at the Inns of
Court, or from contemporary treatises or those by modern lawyers from
Blackstone to Holdsworth and Plucknett. The reprinting of so many and
such long quotations from readily available books requires the reader's close
attention to make sure just whose words he is taking in. This task is facili-
tated, however, by the superb typography of the University of Minnesota
Press.
The product is a compendium, more than an analysis, of commentary on
the Charter, and it offers many a shortcut to much legal data. A full array
of footnotes, appendices, and an all-inclusive bibliography will be a boon to
scholars seeking material about any aspect of the law remotely connected with
Magna Carta. But they must be careful in referring to chapters of the
Charter, for Miss Thompson uses the chapter numbers (1-37) of Henry
III's 1225 charter instead of the 63 in John's which historians normally fol-
low. This departure from the conventional numeration is justified since the
text of 1225 was that used by medieval men; but besides the disappointment
in finding the sacred c. 39 designated c. 29, this usage may lead hurried schol-
ars to unhappy errors. Here, perhaps, the sacrifice of utility and convenience
seems too high a price to pay for historical consistency.
The lawyers' device of summing up in either an introduction or conclusion
is one good habit Miss Thompson neglects. At the end, she might have sum-
marized the -significance and the consequences of the uses to which men put
the charter. Instead, she is content to "confess to having enjoyed the tale
more than the moral," the men "more than the theories they propounded."
If lawyers want to learn about the theories, and historians about the moral, all
the evidence is in and they may judge for themselves. But none of them is
likely to know so much about both as does Miss Thompson, and her excessive
modesty in setting forth so few of her own interpretations is to be regretted.
Her conclusion that even Tudor lawyers did not forget Magna Carta, as has
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been inferred from Shakespeare's failure to cite it in ICng John, may help to
scotch that myth. But her rehabilitation of the Tudors is only relative, for
she makes it clear that the Jacobean scholar-politicians, Coke, Selden, Pr)nne
and the rest, were the ones who salvaged the charter and recreated it for
future generations. To them we owe Magna Carta in modem dress-the
myths about it-for they used old law, and bad, to make new history.
WILLIAM H. DUNHAM, JR.f
THE JEwIsH YhnRBoo oF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1948. Edited by N. Fein-
berg and J. Stoyanovsky. Jerusalem: Rubin Mass, Publisher, 1949. Pp.
xv, 304. $8.00.
THE State of Israel is twice-born: once in law and once in battle. Israel's
combined reliance on right and might has led to some curious contrast. Dur-
ing the war, law books were used as barricades. Today the Supreme Court
of Israel carries on business under the guns of the Arab Legion less than five
hundred yards away. The printing of the present volume, which concerns
various subjects of international law Which are of particular Jewish interest,
was itself delayed some nine or ten months due to violence and war. But its
very appearance is evidence that Israel can now cast its lot with formalized
law.
To those who fought for the Jewish State, international law must have
seemed a mockery. The solemn Mandate of the League of Nations was of
small moment to the British Mandatory.2 And the Partition Resolution of the
United Nations' General Assembly didn't seem any more effective. The cold
fact is that Israel would not now exist had her people not resisted the laws of
many countries: they immigrated illegally; they smuggled and stole arms; and
then they won an all-6ut war.
Despite this, the Jewish people have long been a considerable force
in the shaping of international law and international relations. They were
often in the forefront of the trade which led to international commercial
law. As an unpopular minority, they relied for protection--often unsuccess-
fully-on the law and order of the countries of their residence. Moreover, the
Zionist movement has always claimed its basis in international justice. Finally,
the plight of the Jews has led to two high points of United Nations achieve-
ment: the Declaration of Human Rights and the Genocide Convention.
Today Israel's outlook is international. Israel is made up of heterogeneous
elements from all over the globe. The new nation is much indebted for moral
t George Burton Adams Professor of History, Yale University.
1. P. vi.
2. For a persuasive demonstration of this point see Stoyanovsky, Law and Policy
Under the Palestipe Mandate, p. 42.
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and material support from many places. Perhaps more important, it requires
this support for the future.
Accordingly, despite its current opposition to the United Nations' desire to
internationalize Jerusalem, Israel has chosen to rely primarily on the nebulous
processes of international justice rather than on force of arms. Her impressive
Declaration of Independence is addressed to rights which have long been recog-
nized among other nations. When Israel triumphed at war it was felt that she
could win her way to the Jordan, and even beyond. But the nation's leaders held
back despite vigorous criticism from the militarists who could claim a vital
part in the success of the new State. In the country's first general election, on
January 25, 1949, the party representing the expansionist viewpoint polled
only about 11% of the votes. And even this party is coming to feel that the
choice has been made.
Emphasis on international law generally follows from a firm basis in inter-
nal law. Israel, at least, inherits from the period of the Mandate a crystallized
set of laws in a system of jurisprudence much like our own. Nevertheless,
many vexing problems of internal law and government will inevitably arise.
And the present Israel Supreme Court of Appeals and High Court of Justice
-even with its ranks augmented by two temporary members-is already
heavily burdened. Israel's Draft Constitution was to be submitted to the par-
liament (Knesset) elected in January, 1949. But, partly for reasons of politi-
cal strategy, the Government has not yet brought the Constitution up for ap-
proval. If anything like the Draft Constitution is adopted, the Court will have
to pass on such major matters as the constitutionality of legislation and the
workings of government.
In these circumstances, any advancement of legal scholarship does an im-
portant service. Thus the appearance of The Jewish Yearbook of Itterna-
tional Law is a significant event. The Yearbook is a collection of materials,
"some of which deal with various questions arising out of the Palestine Man-
date, while others relate to more general questions which present certain spe-
cifically Jewish aspects or in which the Jewish people as a whole has a particu-
lar interest." 3  But two included documents, the Declaration of Human
Rights4 and the Genocide Convention,5 which satisfy these criteria, are impor-
tant to all people in all countries and not just to the Jewish people. Moreover,
of universal importance, Israel serves as a testing ground for the United Na-
tions. The editors of the Yearbook deplore the weakness of the United Na-
tions in dealing with the Palestine issue after the Partition Resolution.,
Nevertheless, as one article demonstrates,7 the member nations worked out a
solution which they brought at least to the blueprint stage. The value of the
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The General Assembly's treatment of the Jerusalem question has stirred up
much controversy. But outside of Israel military circles, even those who
are disappointed in the performance of the international organization con-
cede that it played an important part in the creation of Israel.
Most of the ten articles and five notes in the Yearbook are concerned with
matters of less universal interest. We find, among others, an article on The
Recognition of the Jewish People in International Law.8 The article traces
international recognition from the time of earliest humanitarian intervention
until treatment first as a Nation, and now as a State. In the same vein is an
article dealing with the international protection of minorities, and, more re-
cently, positive promotion of human rights.0 Unfortunately the article was
written before adoption of the Declaration of Human Rights. A description
of the International Refugee Organization 0 was also written too early for
maximum usefulness. But the timeliness and caliber of the final four articles"
is not diminished by the delay in publication.
The format is similar to that of The Anmerican Journal of Interational Law
or The British Year Book of International Law. The common thread is the
concern with questions of international law in which the Jewish people have a
particular interest. Except for this theme, however, the first volume of The
Jewish Yearbook of International Law is a disconnected collection of meritori-
ous pieces by prominent authorities. But they are pieces which might never
have been printed elsewhere. It is fortunate, therefore, that a forum has been
provided for exploration of the many important developments in international
law in which Israel and the Jewish people have played an important role. More-
over, the early appearance of this volume demonstrates the solicitude for in-
ternational law typical of the infant State. For these two reasons, Doctors
Feinberg and Stoyanovsky have taken an important step by editing the Year-
book.
ARTHuR M. MicHAEr.soNt
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vidual Responsibility for Acts of State in International Law, p. 226.
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